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I. INTRODUCTION: NORMALIZING INTIMATE SURVEILLANCE 
Data collection and analytics have pervaded nearly every sphere of daily life, 
from commerce1 to health2, from transport3 to education,4 to employment.5 Accom-
panying the data imperative is an emergent social paradigm: the normalization of 
surveillance across contexts and scales. Even what we think of as our most personal 
relationships are not immune to data’s infiltration, as we come to define and man-
age these relations through data exchange,6 and to quantify and analyze the most 
mundane aspects of our daily existence in incredibly fine-grained detail;7 social 
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 1. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html. 
 2. David W. Bates et al., Big Data in Health Care: Using Analytics to Identify and Manage 
High-Risk and High-Cost Patients, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1123, 1123–24 (2014). 
 3. Adele Peters, Boston is Using Uber Data to Plan Better Urban Transportation, CO.EXIST 
(Jan. 16, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3040964/boston-is-using-uber-data-to-plan-better-
urban-transportation. 
 4. Lisa Fleisher, Big Data Enters the Classroom, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2014, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304756104579451241225610478. 
 5. Steve Lohr, Unblinking Eyes Track Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/technology/workplace-surveillance-sees-good-and-bad.html. 
 6. Karen E.C. Levy, Relational Big Data, 66 STANFORD L. REV. ONLINE 73 (2013), available 
at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/relational-big-data. 
 7. Dawn Nafus & Jamie Sherman, This One Does Not Go Up to 11: The Quantified Self 
Movement as an Alternative Big Data Practice, 8 INT’L J. COMM. 1784 (2014); Anne Helen Petersen, Big 
Mother is Watching You, BUZZFEED (Jan. 1, 2015, 9:43 AM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/annehelenpetersen/the-track-everything-revolution-is-here-to-improve-you-
wheth. 
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surveillance has become the rule.8 This article examines the rise of the surveillant 
paradigm within some of our most intimate relationships and behaviors—those 
relating to love, romance, and sexual activity—and considers what challenges this 
sort of data collection raises for privacy and the foundations of intimate life. 
Data-gathering about intimate behavior was, not long ago, more commonly 
the purview of state public health authorities, which have routinely gathered per-
sonally identifiable information in the course of their efforts to (among other 
things) fight infectious disease.9 But new technical capabilities, social norms, and 
cultural frameworks are beginning to change the nature of intimate monitoring 
practices. Intimate surveillance is emerging and becoming normalized as primarily 
an interpersonal phenomenon, one in which all sorts of people engage, for all sorts 
of reasons. The goal is not top-down management of populations, but establishing 
knowledge about (and, ostensibly, concomitant control over) one’s own intimate 
relations and activities.10 
After briefly describing some scope conditions on this inquiry, I survey sev-
eral types of monitoring technologies used across the “life course” of an intimate 
relationship—from dating to sex and romance, from fertility to fidelity, to abuse. I 
then examine the relationship between data collection, values, and privacy, and 
close with a few words about the uncertain role of law and policy in the sphere of 
intimate surveillance. 
II. WHAT THIS ARTICLE IS NOT ABOUT 
The nexus between sexuality and technology is an area of rapid growth and 
evolution, and one that presents a number of unique challenges to legal regulation. 
This Article does not attempt to elucidate the entire range of emergent sexual sur-
veillance practices; in consideration of the focus of the Symposium, it focuses gen-
erally on practices occurring within the home, often (though not always) between 
consensual partners. Even with this scope in mind, the list of surveillance tools and 
practices I discuss in Section III is not intended to be exhaustive. Still, in light of 
the importance of some intimate surveillance issues this Article does not discuss, I 
explicitly note here some of the practices I bracket from my analysis. These issues 
are pressing and complex, and deserving of their own careful treatment by policy-
makers, legal scholars, and social scientists. 
For one, this article is not about the relationship between technology and sex 
work (i.e., the provision of sexual services for payment) or sex trafficking. A good 
deal of promising research is emerging on the role of technology in sex work and 
sex trafficking—including both the use of mobile phones and social media to facili-
                                                          
 8. See Alice E. Marwick, The Public Domain: Surveillance in Everyday Life, 9 SURVEILLANCE 
& SOC’Y 378, 385 (2012). 
 9. Amy Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data: HIV and the History, Ethics, and Uses of 
Identifiable Public Health Information, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 7 (2007); AMY L. FAIRCHILD ET AL., 
SEARCHING EYES: PRIVACY, THE STATE, AND DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA (2007). 
 10. Levy, supra note 6; see also Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 
66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 83 (2013) (“Individuals eventually will be able to harness big datasets, tools, 
and techniques to expand dramatically the number and magnitude of privacy harms to themselves and 
others . . . . This is problematic in an age when so many aspects of our social relationships with others are 
turned into data.”). 
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tate trafficking11 and the use of new analytic techniques to combat the sex trade.12 
The Economist recently analyzed nearly 200,000 social media profiles of female 
sex workers online to produce a “big data” analysis of the economics of commer-
cial sex.13 Because sex trafficking and sex work take place largely outside the do-
mestic sphere and pose unique technical, social, and legal problems, I exclude them 
from my discussion here. 
Second, this article does not attempt to analyze the dynamics of online sex 
scandals or the problem of online sexual harassment, such as the massive celebrity 
nude photo hack of 2014 (known popularly as “The Fappening,” in which nude 
photos of dozens of female celebrities, some minors, were leaked online without 
the women’s consent).14 Nor does it touch upon the widespread harassment of 
women online, such as the “Gamergate” controversy, in which a number of explicit 
threats (both on and offline) were made against Anita Sarkeesian and other cultural 
critics who highlighted sexism in video game culture.15 The legal and social chal-
lenges presented by viral, distributed sexism of this nature are sufficiently distinct 
from the issues I discuss here that I do not attempt to include them in my analysis. 
Finally, though this article does address nonconsensual and abusive sexual ac-
tivity to some extent—particularly in the context of domestic violence and electron-
ic monitoring or stalking of one’s (current or former) partner—it does not address 
rape specifically, or the relationship between technology and sexual violence more 
broadly. This is obviously an issue of pressing concern, but also one deserving of 
its own analysis, which I do not undertake here.16 
III. THE LIFE COURSE OF INTIMATE SURVEILLANCE 
Opportunities for the monitoring, recording, and quantification of intimate ac-
tivity exist across a wide variety of intimate relations, behaviors, and activities. In 
this section, I outline a (non-exhaustive) list of some of the products and services 
available for intimate monitoring. I organize these practices roughly along the “life 
course” of a relationship—from the search for an intimate partner via dating, to 
consensual sexual behavior, to questions of fertility, to issues dealing with abuse, 
violence, and revenge. 
                                                          
 11. Mark Latonero, The Rise of Mobile and the Diffusion of Technology-Facilitated Trafficking, 
TECH. & HUMAN TRAFFICKING, Nov. 2012, available at 
https://technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/files/2012/11/HumanTrafficking2012_Nov12.pdf. 
 12. Neal Ungerleider, How Mobile Phones and The Internet Fight (And Help) Human Traffick-
ing, CO.EXIST (Jan. 8, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/1681155/how-mobile-phones-and-the-
internet-fight-and-help-human-trafficking. 
 13. Why The Price of Commercial Sex is Falling, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 11, 2014, 11:50 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/08/economist-explains-7. 
 14. Valeriya Safronova, Jennifer Lawrence’s Strong Stance on Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/fashion/jennifer-lawrences-strong-stance-on-privacy.html. 
 15. Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in ‘GamerGate’ Cam-
paign, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/technology/gamergate-women-
video-game-threats-anita-sarkeesian.html. 
 16. For an analysis of one aspect of the nexus between data collection and sexual violence, see 
Karen Levy, Rape Is Not a Data Problem, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2014, 6:15 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/10/rape-is-not-a-data-problem/381904/. 
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A. Dating: Scoping Out Potential Intimates 
The beginnings of intimate relationships are increasingly marked by their re-
liance on data collection about a potential partner. A good deal of this interpersonal 
surveillance occurs on standard social networks—it has become pro forma to inves-
tigate a potential mate through Google search and through monitoring his or her 
social media profiles (what’s commonly, and problematically, known as “Facebook 
stalking”).17 A wealth of articles in the popular press impart advice for covert yet 
effective monitoring via social media. As a representative Cosmopolitan column 
reports, “everyone’s lurked on someone’s Facebook page because they’ve hooked 
up with the person, or want to hook up with the person, or want to see the last per-
son the stalkee has hooked up with.”18 The column continues to give readers tips 
about how to “stalk” without being detected (“unlike” something immediately if 
you accidentally “like” it; don’t reveal offline that you know lots of details about 
that person’s life history).19 
In addition, a wealth of more specialized services offer the opportunity to 
gather and create data for use in budding romantic relationships. An app called Lu-
lu20 attracted enormous attention (and concern) when it was released as a “girls-
only app for dating intelligence.”21 Lulu focuses on college campuses, and allows 
young women to anonymously review male friends, using a multiple-choice quiz 
(categories include “humor, manners, ambition, commitment level, look and style, 
sex and kissing”22) and a selection of hashtags from a pre-populated list 
(#DudeCanCook, for instance, or #SexualPanther).23 Lulu translates user input into 
a numerical rating visible to other users of the app.24 (While previous versions of 
the app allowed women to rate any male associate to whom they were connected on 
Facebook, concerns about privacy and abuse led to a change in this policy such that 
men can only be reviewed and scored if they have explicitly opted into the ser-
vice.25) 
Some services combine elements of online dating with data about a user’s ge-
ographic location, often to the chagrin of privacy advocates.26 Apps like iHookup,27 
Tinder,28 and Grindr29 use mobile phones’ locative capabilities to match users with 
                                                          
 17.  See Marwick, supra note 8, at 387–88. 
 18. Dara Adeeyo, 9 Soul-Crushing Facebook Stalking Fails Everyone Makes, COSMOPOLITAN 
(Sep. 13, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/advice/a4782/facebook-stalking-fails/. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Lulu, http://www.onlulu.com (last visited May11, 2015). 
 21. Mike Butcher, Lulu Raises Another $2.5M From Yuri Milner And Angels For Its Girls-Only 
App to Rate Guys, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 5, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/02/05/lulu-raises-another-2-
5m-from-yuri-milnerangels-for-its-girls-only-app-to-rate-guys/. 
 22. What Is My Lulu Score?, LULU, http://support.onlulu.com/knowledge_base/topics/what-is-
my-lulu-score (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 23. Karen Levy, Data-Driven Dating: How Data Are Shaping Our Most Intimate Personal Re-
lationships, PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (Dec. 17, 2013), https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/data-driven-
dating-how-data-are-shaping-our-most-intimate-personal-relation. 
 24. Id. 
 25. EJ Dickson, Lulu Quietly Changed Its App So That It’s Opt-In for Dudes, THE DAILY DOT 
(Mar. 19, 2014, 12:36 PM), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/lulu-app-ranking/. 
 26. See, e.g., Locational Privacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, 
https://www.eff.org/issues/location-privacy (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 27. iHookup Social, http://www.ihookupsocial.com/ (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 28. Tinder, http://www.gotinder.com (last visited May 10, 2015). 
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others in their immediate proximity for opportune social or sexual encounters. Oth-
ers cater to users with geographically particular concerns, such as an app developed 
in Iceland—a small country with a fairly homogeneous genetic pool—that draws 
on a large genealogical database to alert users with an “Incest Spoiler” if two mutu-
ally interested users share a common grandparent.30 
B. Tracking Intimate and Romantic Practices 
Another set of services and applications facilitates “data-fication” of romantic 
or sexual behavior. One such app, Spreadsheets,31 captures audio and motion data 
using the iPhone’s microphone and accelerometer functionalities in order to track 
sexual performance. Spreadsheets graphs duration, number of thrusts, and audio 
volume, and allows users to set personal goals and “unlock” achievements.32 A 
number of similar apps are available, and often include the capability to keep rec-
ords of several types of data (including, commonly, number and identity of sex 
partners, or duration and quality of sexual experiences).33 The app Hula (recently 
rechristened as Healthvana)34 takes another tack: it allows users to receive, verify, 
and share results of STD tests with sexual partners (through a process it calls “un-
zipping”).35 
 Wearable sex trackers are another breed of technologies in this space. The 
SexFit is a Wifi-enabled ring that sits at the base of the penis (currently in proto-
type stage) that tracks thrusting rhythm, speed, and calorie burn; the associated 
iPhone app “tells you whether to slow down or speed up your thrusting.”36 In addi-
tion, “the SexFit allows the most dedicated users to share and compare their favour-
ite sessions and impressive individual milestones with their peers on social me-
dia.”37 The kGoal,38 a “smart” pelvic floor exerciser, consists of a Kegel training 
tool wirelessly connected to a phone app; it visualizes progress and gives real-time 
biofeedback, and the company is reportedly at work on creating games to go along 
with the system.39 
A related group of technologies aims to gamify intimate relationships by in-
centivizing romantic behaviors through points, badges, levels, or other indicia of 
                                                                                                                                       
 29. Grindr, http://grindr.com (last visited May 10, 2015).  
 30. Ian Steadman, App to Prevent ‘Accidental Incest’ Proves a Hit with Icelanders, WIRED UK 
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/18/iceland-incest-app. 
 31. Spreadsheets, http://spreadsheetsapp.com (last visited May 10, 2015).  
 32. Eric Ravenscraft, Spreadsheets Adds Data Tracking, Achievements to Your Sex Life, 
LIFEHACKER (Mar. 14, 2014), http://afterhours.lifehacker.com/spreadsheets-adds-data-tracking-
achievements-to-your-s-1544181748. 
 33. Deborah Lupton, Quantified Sex: A Critical Analysis of Sexual and Reproductive Self-
Tracking Using Apps, 17 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13691058.2014.920528#.U56zWfmSySo. 
 34. Hula, http://www.hulahq.com (last visited May 10, 2015).  
 35. Eliana Dockterman, STD Tests: There’s an App for That, TIME, Jan. 7, 2014, available at 
http://healthland.time.com/2014/01/07/std-tests-theres-an-app-for-that/. 
 36. Editorial Staff, New “Fitbit” For Your Penis Tracks How Well You Have Sex, NEXTSHARK, 
Aug. 7, 2014, http://nextshark.com/new-fitbit-for-your-penis-tracks-how-well-you-have-sex/. 
 37. Id. 
 38. MINNA LIFE, http://www.minnalife.com/products/kgoal (last visited May 10, 2015). 
 39. Daniel Cooper, A Piece about a Smart Pelvic Floor Exerciser, Written by Someone Totally 
Out of Their Depth, ENGADGET (Jun. 30, 2014, 5:18 AM), http://www.engadget.com/2014/06/30/kgoal-
pelvic-floor-exerciser-kickstarter/. 
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success.40 The (recently defunct) app Kahnoodle was one such example: its features 
included “sending push notifications to initiate sex; ‘Koupons’ that entitle the bear-
er to redeemable movie nights and kinky sex; and. . . [a] love tank, which fills or 
empties depending on how many acts of love you’ve logged.”41 Apps like this ac-
cord with calls from some researchers and clinicians for numerical marriage rating 
as a productive psychotherapeutic practice for couples.42 
C. Monitoring Fertility 
Another class of technologies provide monitoring related to fertility and birth 
control. Data tracking related to fertility is not new: women have long tracked per-
sonal data (including menstrual cycle, basal body temperature, and other indicators) 
in order to facilitate or prevent pregnancy.43 However, new services introduce a 
new dimension to such monitoring by embedding it more directly in women’s rela-
tionships—both intimate and commercial.  
The app Glow,44 launched in 2013 by PayPal founder Max Levchin, is credit-
ed by some as “[getting] 25,000 women pregnant.”45 The app tracks a variety of 
types of data—menstruation, the position and firmness of a woman’s cervix, sexual 
intercourse (including the woman’s position during ejaculation), mood, and more—
in order to predict ovulation.46 For women who are already pregnant, the related 
app Glow Nurture47 allows women to track pregnancy symptoms, and encourages 
healthy behaviors like exercise and taking prenatal vitamins.48 
But what distinguishes Glow and Glow Nurture from other fertility and preg-
nancy trackers (of which there are a number available) is that they explicitly make 
intimate data collection a family affair. Glow encourages you to sign up your part-
ner to download a “mirror” app; the partner is prompted to provide additional data 
(for instance, to “provide ‘objective’ readings of your disposition”49) and to re-
spond to his partner’s cycle in certain ways—for instance, to send a “thoughtful 
                                                          
 40. See generally JANE MCGONIGAL, REALITY IS BROKEN: WHY GAMES MAKE US BETTER 
AND HOW THEY CAN CHANGE THE WORLD (2011). 
 41. Susie Neilson, When a Relationship Becomes a Game, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 8, 2013, 9:00 
AM) http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/08/when-a-relationship-becomes-a-game/278459/. 
 42. Elizabeth Bernstein, Why Rate Your Marriage? A Numerical Score Can Help Couples Talk 
About Problems, WALL. ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:10 PM) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304854804579234103858173602. 
 43. Arielle Duhaime-Ross, Apple Promised An Expansive Health App, So Why Can’t I Track 
Menstruation?, THE VERGE (Sept. 25, 2014, 12:55 PM), 
http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/25/6844021/apple-promised-an-expansive-health-app-so-why-cant-i-
track. 
 44. GLOW, https://glowing.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
 45. Preetisha Sen, How Max Levchin’s Glow App Got 25,000 Women Pregnant, FORTUNE (Aug. 
27, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/08/27/how-max-levchins-glow-app-got-25000-women-
pregnant/. 
 46.  GLOW, supra note 44.  
 47. GLOW NURTURE, https://glowing.com/features_nurture (last visited May 6, 2015). 
 48. Id.  
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love text”50 to a partner experiencing PMS. Glow also offers customized “tips” to 
both female users and their partners: “the app might remind a woman on an espe-
cially fertile day that it’s a good time to wear nice underwear. Her partner might 
receive a notification on the same day to bring flowers home.”51 The Glow Nurture 
app, for women who are pregnant, prompts a man to bring a glass of water to his 
partner if she has not yet logged eight glasses of water consumed via her own ver-
sion of the app. 
Glow doesn’t stop with partner integration. The company recently announced 
a new pharmacy partnership: if a woman tells Glow that she uses prescription birth 
control pills, Glow will remind her within the application when her prescription is 
running low, and will prompt her to refill the prescription at a Walgreens or Duane 
Reade.52 Integration with Walgreens’ Prescription Refill API allows her to author-
ize the refill directly within the app.53 
Another approach to fertility tracking is a group of period trackers intended to 
be used by men: a set of apps that track a woman’s menstrual cycle for the benefit 
of her partner’s ability to “manage” his relationship with her around it. The (now 
defunct) app PMSBuddy, which at one point boasted over 150,000 registered us-
ers,54 offered “push notifications of upcoming PMS and the. . . ability to locate 
flower shops near you (via GPS).”55 PMSTracker provided a similar service for the 
man “[t]ired of [his] wife/girlfriend/sister/mom/secretary biting [his] head off un-
expectedly once a month.”56 A man using the app Code Red57 entered the last 
known day of his partner’s period into the app, and then waited to receive various 
push alerts (such as a “Horny Alert” which informs him he’s “able to score,” “Ovu-
lation Alert”—time to “sit on the sidelines (unless you’re ready to start a junior 
league)”—and “Code Red Alert” for when “it’s game time and you’re way out of 
bounds.”58 Finally, the (still available!) app iAmAMan not only enables period 
tracking, but assists in “private life planning”59 by enabling tracking of several 
women’s cycles at once; but “[j]ust in case one of your ‘girlfriends asks you to 
                                                          
 50. Id. 
 51. Lauren Goode, Max Levchin’s New Plan: To Get You Pregnant (And Improve Health Care 
in the Process), ALL THINGS D (May 29, 2013, 11:14 AM), http://allthingsd.com/20130529/max-levchins-
new-plan-to-get-you-pregnant-and-improve-health-care-in-the-process/. 
 52. Refill Your Birth Control Prescription with Walgreens on Glow, GLOW BLOG(Jan. 29, 
2015), http://blog.glowing.com/post/109494619045/refill-your-birth-control-prescription-with. 
 53. Todd Wasserman, Walgreens Now Lets Women Refill Birth Control Prescriptions Via 
Smartphones, MASHABLE (Jan. 29, 2015), http://mashable.com/2015/01/29/walgreens-birth-control-glow-
app. 
 54. Elinor Mills, Menstrual Calendar Apps…For Men, CNET (Feb. 3, 2009, 2:42 PM), 
http://www.cnet.com/news/menstrual-calendar-apps-for-men/. 
 55. Leena Rao, PMSBuddy Helps (Men) Track That “Time of the Month,” TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 
19, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/19/pmsbuddy-helps-men-track-that-time-of-the-month/. 
 56. Mills, supra note 54. 
 57. Monica Hesse, ‘Code Red’: iPhone/iPad App for Men Who Need to Track Women’s Men-
strual Cycles, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/21/AR2010042104578.html. 
 58. Jodi Jacobson, iPhone, iPad Apps Allow Men to Track Women’s Menstrual Periods. Seri-
ously., RH REALITY CHECK (Apr. 22, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2010/04/22/iphone-
apps-allow-track-womens-menstrual-periods-seriously/. 
 59. Matt Buchanan, IAmAMan Period-Tracking iPhone App for Sleazy, Shameless “Players,” 
GIZMODO (Dec. 30, 2008 10:45 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5120556/iamaman-period-tracking-iphone-app-
for-sleazy-shameless-players. 
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open up the app . . . each girl can be set with their [sic] own separate password, so 
when you punch it in, it only looks like you’re tracking her.”60 
D. Surveillance, Abuse, and Revenge 
Monitoring technologies pervade a darker side of intimate relations, too—
namely, keeping tabs on a partner’s whereabouts and communications, often sur-
reptitiously. These uses of data facilitate abusive relationships and electronic stalk-
ing, and are often used in situations involving domestic violence. In other situa-
tions, nonconsensual data “reveals” are used for retaliatory purposes—to exact “re-
venge” at the end of a relationship. 
A huge number of partner “spy” apps exist, with names like Flexispy, Wife 
Spy, Girlfriend Spy, Spyera, and ePhoneTracker. The apps are intended to be in-
stalled surreptitiously on a partner’s mobile phone, where they run undetected in 
“stealth mode”; they typically capture a wide range of information, generally in-
cluding web browsing, phone call and messaging history (sometimes including 
audio recording), as well as real-time locational data.61 Some allow remote activa-
tion of the phone’s microphone to unwittingly listen in on a partner by capturing 
ambient audio data.62 While some depend on an abuser temporarily taking physical 
control of the phone to install the application, others work differently. For instance, 
the now-defunct Loverspy was delivered through an electronic greeting card, which 
(after it was unwittingly opened by a victim) installed malware that was used to 
capture the content of messages, passwords, and web history; the FBI has since 
indicted Loverspy’s creators.63 
The marketing of such applications can be shocking. HelloSpy, which inter-
cepts phone location as well as contacts, app usage, web history, and the content of 
messages, advertises that “[t]he past two decades has [sic] made infidelity more 
accessible than ever mostly because of the ascent of two majorly disruptive tech-
nologies: online social networks and mobile phones. Up to 90% of marital affairs 
may include the use of a mobile phone or email as a preferred means for communi-
cation.”64 This information appears alongside a photograph of a man physically 
restraining a woman, whose face is visibly beaten and lacerated.65 This disturbing 
“testimonial” appears to suggest that the man was able to detect, and fittingly pun-
ish, his partner’s infidelity thanks to the services of HelloSpy. 
Domestic violence advocacy groups say that the use of such apps has reached 
“epidemic proportions”; one study estimates that over 50 percent of abusive part-
                                                          
 60. Id. 
 61. Cahal Milmo, Exclusive: Abusers Using Spyware Apps to Monitor Partners Reaches ‘Epi-
demic Proportions’, THE INDEP. (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-
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ners use “some . . . form of electronic surveillance to stalk their victims.”66 In an-
other survey, 85% of domestic violence shelters said they worked with victims who 
were stalked using GPS, and women are advised to complete a “digital detox” upon 
intake to prevent abusers from locating them at the shelter.67 
It should be noted that not all abuse and harassment using digital data depend 
on specialized cyberstalking apps. “Real name” policies on some web services can 
facilitate continued abuse of victims,68 as can data brokers and websites that cata-
logue contact information and residential history.69 
Finally, intimate data are often revealed non-consensually for retaliatory pur-
poses. The best-known exemplar is what’s often called “revenge porn,” in which 
sexually explicit photographs of one partner are posted or distributed online with-
out that partner’s consent. In other cases, revenge-seeking partners may post in-
criminating evidence of adultery to social media (e.g., text messages).70 
IV. RISKS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Should it come as a surprise that intimate relationships are increasingly gov-
erned by monitoring and quantification? Not particularly. As described, data’s infil-
tration of intimacy follows its intrusion into virtually every other social sphere. But 
the rise of data in intimate relations poses unique risks to privacy and challenges to 
interpersonal dynamics, which I outline here. 
A. Quantification as Objectivity, Measurement as Control 
It’s entirely understandable that there’s a market for intimate surveillance and 
quantification. These technologies purport to give users more control and 
knowledge in an area of life rife with unknowns and in which users are uniquely 
vulnerable, both emotionally and physically. Just as we aim to reduce uncertainty 
in our consumer lives by reading Yelp reviews—or by checking up on the wherea-
bouts of our packages using online shipment trackers—we similarly try to protect 
our interests and grant ourselves a modicum of control by screening and tracking 
information about our intimate relations and behaviors. 
But the act of measurement is not neutral. Every technology of measurement 
and classification legitimates certain forms of knowledge and experience, while 
rendering others invisible.71 The types of data that are tracked and measured by 
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these apps are embedded in technological contexts, as well as sociocultural con-
texts. For instance, for sex tracker apps, most smartphones are capable of tracking 
audio and accelerometer data, so these types of data are what get counted (and con-
structed as “good” sexual behaviors): “sex is judged by thrusting, success is judged 
by endurance, and pleasure is measured in moans.”72 Because these technologies 
generate numbers that can be charted, graphed, and compared to the “performance” 
of others, they simplify highly personal and subjective experiences to commen-
surable data points, and run the risk of reductively (and normatively) constructing 
the “quality” of intimate behaviors along a very limited set of axes.73 As described 
by Lupton, such technologies thus introduce an “algorithmic subjectivity” to our 
understandings of intimate relations and behaviors:74 
These devices could . . . be regarded as disciplinary, working to tame the 
sexual and reproductive body by rendering it amenable to monitoring, 
tracking, and detailed analysis of the data thus generated[. . . . ] These 
technologies configure a certain type of approach to understanding and 
experiencing one’s body, an algorithmic subjectivity, in which the body 
and its health states, functions and activities are portrayed and understood 
predominantly via quantified calculations, predictions and comparisons.75 
The ways we regulate and police intimate technologies are also not neutral, 
but governed by the sociocultural realities in which we live. Consider Sarah 
Jeong’s contention that law enforcement is often complicit “in the abuse of tech-
nology”76 related to intimate violence, in part because law enforcement officers are 
overwhelmingly male, and in part because intrusions on intimate data (including 
sexual images) have become disturbingly routine “perks” in law enforcement con-
texts, from the NSA to the California Highway Patrol.77 Further, it is striking how 
many technologies of intimate surveillance construct women, in particular, as mon-
itored subjects. From women’s bodies and cycles to their whereabouts, communi-
cations, and activities, services from Glow to Wife Spy to Girls Around Me expose 
women especially to data collection, invasive monitoring, and increased visibility. 
Intimate surveillance gives us a sense of control over a fundamentally uncon-
trollable dimension of personal life: we can only control that which we can track 
and measure.78 As Foucault states, “power will be exercised by virtue of the mere 
fact of things being known and people seen[.]”79 But this sense of control can, ulti-
mately, be illusory—and the impulse can be quite harmful to intimate relations (or 
in some situations, even criminal and pathological). 
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B. Monitoring, Trust, and Intimate Values 
As intimate data-gathering becomes more prevalent, the reality of social sur-
veillance becomes increasingly normalized—in both intimate and non-intimate 
contexts. The more we encounter and use such technologies, the more they come to 
be seen as simply a fact of modern relational life, and an inescapable component of 
intimacy.80 Consider how normal (and normative) the “Facebook stalk” and other 
means of gathering pre-dating intelligence have already become; at minimum, 
Googling a potential partner before dating him or her is essentially social due dili-
gence. We might expect to see other areas of intimate life become increasingly 
governed by such a surveillant paradigm. 
A data-driven mentality might affect the qualities of intimate relations as 
well.81 Digital records create new sites of accountability that appear morally neutral 
and can come to displace social trust. Trust has long been an essential foundation of 
intimate relations and an important motivator of prosocial behavior. If partners re-
main faithful because they’re afraid of being “tattled on” by digital technology, 
rather than out of a sense of loyalty to their partner, does fidelity retain its 
longstanding social and emotional significance? 
Similarly, apps that quantify or calculate previously incommensurable aspects 
of intimate relationships may create new motivations for certain behaviors. For 
instance, regarding Kahnoodle and other romance quantifiers, psychologist Eli 
Finkel suggests that gamification may foster a tit-for-tat “exchange mentality” that 
is ultimately detrimental to the foundations of intimate relations, and ultimately 
divests romantic gestures of their meaning.82 
C. Privacy Risks 
Increased data collection brings with it increased risk to privacy, as data are 
put to unanticipated uses, security safeguards are breached, or information flows to 
commercial parties who are external to the immediate intimate relation. A number 
of discrete risks exist; some stem primarily from the parties to the relationship 
themselves, while others relate to the commercial technological platforms on which 
intimate monitoring typically relies. 
Some of the sorts of monitoring described here are (or could easily be used in 
ways that are) surreptitious or nonconsensual. Sex trackers don’t require the con-
sent of the other party before data about that party is entered. Apps that facilitate 
digital stalking are, essentially by definition, nonconsensual, as is the posting of 
revenge porn. Some dating data collectors draw on users’ location without their 
explicit consent; for instance, for a period of time, an iPhone app called Girls 
Around Me drew on women’s publicly visible Facebook and Foursquare data to 
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create a real-time “radar map,” complete with photos, of women around the user.83 
(The app was later pulled from the iTunes Store.)84 
A second set of privacy risks relates to the fact that intimate data are typically 
collected by, and stored on, decidedly non-intimate commercial platforms. Thus, 
even data that appear to be shared only within an intimate partnership may also be 
shared with (or sold to) other parties—including app developers, internet service 
providers, advertisers, or data brokers and aggregators.85 These relationships are 
typically governed by fine-print privacy policies and terms-of-service agree-
ments—but we know that consumers very rarely read and understand such agree-
ments,86 that the way they are presented often makes consumers vulnerable to ex-
ploitation,87 and that, under the third-party doctrine, the “voluntary” revelation of 
data to third parties reduces the reasonable expectation of privacy that legally in-
heres in such data for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection.88 
Sometimes the revelation of intimate data by commercial actors seems to be 
unintentional. In 2011, Fitbit (a wearable pedometer with associated activity tracker 
app) received negative press for a gaffe in which it revealed intimate data about 
users’ sexual practices, apparently inadvertently.89 Fitbit users’ profiles, including 
activity tracking information users had manually inputted into the app, were set to 
be public by default; among the categories of activity users could report were “sex-
ual activity – active, vigorous effort” and “sexual activity – passive, light effort, 
kissing, hugging,” along with the duration of such activity.90 Not only were these 
data made public, and associated with users’ identifying information on Fitbit’s site 
(at least, until Fitbit realized its gaffe and changed its settings),91 but the infor-
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mation was also indexed by Google; at one point, a journalist reported retrieving 
twelve pages of search results for users’ intimate data.92 
Recall that the fertility app Glow gathers such fine-grained and sensitive data 
as emotional mood, a woman’s position when her partner ejaculates, the firmness 
of her cervix, and quite a bit more—and explicitly encourages a female user to 
connect with her partner using the app.93 Recall as well that Glow has recently 
partnered with Walgreens pharmacies to facilitate in-app purchase of users’ birth 
control prescriptions there.94 But what is less apparent from Glow’s interface is the 
extent to which users’ data may be put to other uses. For one, Glow aims to collect 
and aggregate enough data about its users’ fertility that it can possibly spot as-yet-
unknown correlations for medical study.95 Max Levchin, the app’s founder, jokes 
that “[i]t would be awesome if we could be partly responsible for finding a cure for 
infertility.”96 
In addition, Glow is aiming to bring its big data to bear on the health insur-
ance market. According to a recent Venturebeat report, Glow’s co-founder and 
CEO Mike Huang suggested that using Glow’s data to achieve “a more granular 
understanding” of health could provide “more accurate risk assessments … ulti-
mately result[ing] in better health insurance.”97 It is not clear what “better” means 
in this instance, or for whom better outcomes are expected to result. 
Though Glow may very well take steps to preserve individual users’ privacy 
in putting their data to such uses—for instance, by aggregating the data or scrub-
bing it of personally identifiable information before analyzing it or sharing it with 
other parties—contemporary understandings of privacy suggest that such practices 
may still be normatively problematic, in that they are unlikely to accord with users’ 
expectations about the use of their sensitive data98 or the ecosystems through which 
such information flows (in other words, such uses are likely to violate what Helen 
Nissenbaum terms the contextual integrity99 of these intimate information flows). 
Security breaches are a third area of significant threat, especially in light of 
the acutely sensitive nature of intimate data. Security researchers recently identified 
a technical flaw in Grindr (a mobile dating app used primarily by gay men) that 
enabled real-time, pinpoint location tracking of any one of its users.100 After the 
researchers notified Grindr of the problem—and after Egyptian authorities report-
                                                          
 92. Loftus, supra note 90. 
 93. See Williams, supra note 49. 
 94. See Wasserman, supra note 53. 
 95. Farhad Manjoo, Glow vs. Stick, SLATE (Aug. 8, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2013/08/new_fertility_app_glow_it_wants_to_know_
absolutely_everything_about_you.single.html. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Kia Kokalitcheva, Glow Brings in $17M in New Funding, Puts Big Data to Work For Wom-
en’s Health, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 2, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2014/10/02/glow-brings-in-
17m-in-new-funding-as-puts-big-data-to-task-with-fertility-challenges/. 
 98. See Lupton, supra note 33, at 13 (“Until very recently, many mobile app users viewed the 
information stored on their apps to be private, not realising the extent to which the app developers used 
these data for their own purposes”). 
 99. See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE 
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2009). 
 100. Dan Goodin, How Dating App Grindr Makes It Easy to Stalk 5 Million Gay Men, ARS 
TECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/01/how-dating-app-grindr-
makes-it-easy-to-stalk-5-million-gay-men/. 
692 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
edly used Grindr to track down gays and prosecute them for illegal homosexual 
conduct (though it is unclear if the authorities exploited this particular weakness in 
doing so)101—Grindr disabled location tracking in several countries with anti-gay 
laws. However, the weakness appears to persist in other countries, and seems to be 
common across location-based dating apps.102 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a final inquiry, we should also ask how law and policy will approach inti-
mate data-gathering. Law is making inroads, albeit slowly, in some of these con-
texts, particularly in cases in which data use intersects with criminal law or clear 
cases of nonconsent. Senator Al Franken has repeatedly introduced the Location 
Privacy Protection Act in Congress, which would forbid stalking apps from being 
developed or sold, and would make it more difficult to collect or share locational 
data without consent103 (though app developers have been quick to “rebrand” as 
legal child or employee monitors in order to escape such regulation).104 And a 
number of legal efforts to combat revenge porn have taken root, from criminal stat-
utes105 to dedicated law firm initiatives106 to the use of copyright law.107 But as a 
rule, law has been loath to get too involved in intimate domains (or to “rais[e] the 
curtain upon domestic privacy”108 by exposing to “the evil of publicity”109 that 
which “ought to be left to family government”),110 and some of the new sorts of 
privacy risks created by intimate surveillance are not easily addressable by existing 
legal frameworks (for instance, data-sharing practices that are technically permissi-
ble under terms-of-service agreements, but which violate user expectations and 
contextual norms). 
Surveillance poses new challenges in intimate relational contexts. It encour-
ages an “algorithmic subjectivity” about sexual behavior, normalizes monitoring 
practices and data-driven approaches to intimate relations, and brings to the fore 
complex and thorny issues around privacy, consumer expectations, and the integri-
ty of information flows. This article is not intended to advocate for technological, 
Luddism, or fear-mongering in the face of increased data-gathering; rather, it aims 
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to bring these emergent practices to light, so that we might consider their normative 
and social implications, as intimate relations become permeated by the data para-
digm. 
 
